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Abstract
Although there is an increasing interest in examining the relationship between cogni-
tive ability and economic behavior, less is known about the relationship between cognitive
ability and social preferences. We investigate the relationship between strongly incen-
tivized measures of intelligence and measures of social preferences. We have data on a
series of small-stakes dictator-type decisions, known as Social Value Orientation (SVO),
in addition to choices in a larger-stakes dictator game. We also have access to the grade
point averages (GPA) and Scholastic Aptitude Test (SAT) outcomes of our subjects. We
nd that subjects who perform better on the math portion of the SAT are more generous
in both the dictator game and the SVO measure. By contrast we nd that subjects with
a higher GPA are more selsh in the dictator game and more generous according to the
SVO. We also nd that the consistency of the subjects is related to GPA but we do not
nd evidence that it is related to either portion of the SAT.
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1 Introduction
Researchers have made improvements in understanding behavior by conceptualizing choice
as originating from a brain which is heterogenous across subjects and inuenced by external
factors. For instance, these successes include cognitive hierarchy models (Camerer et al.,
2004), the discovery of a relationship between play in games and the working memory capacity
of the subject (Devetag and Warglien, 2003), the nding that subjects apply similar strategies
across fundamentally di¤erent games which are played in parallel (Bednar et al., 2011) and
a relationship between strategic sophistication and access to sleep (Dickinson and McElroy,
2010).
Experiments in economics tend to exhibit a great deal of subject-specic heterogeneity.
In other words, it is often the case that the range of responses varies greatly among subjects.
One possible explanation of this heterogeneity is that the subjects di¤er in their cognitive
ability.1 As a consequence, researchers have sought to identify a relationship between measures
of intelligence and outcomes in the laboratory. Specically, experiments have found that
measures of intelligence are related to performance on a dynamic savings problem (Ballinger et
al., 2011), learning optimal behavior in a decision problem (Palacios-Huerta, 2003), mistakes
on a forecasting task (Rydval, 2007), the complexity of the strategies implemented in the
repeated prisoners dilemma game (Jones, 2011), outcomes in the repeated prisoners dilemma
(Jones, 2008) and choice in a beauty contest game (Burnham et al., 2009).2
While these papers examine the relationship between intelligence and outcomes in eco-
nomics experiments, less is known about the relationship between cognitive ability and social
preferences. Clarifying the relationship between intelligence and social preferences would
seem to be useful in the interpretation of these experiments. Here we hope to shed new light
on the relationship by analyzing dictator-type allocations decisions and strongly incentivized
measures of intelligence. Our measures of intelligence include data on grade point averages
(hereafter GPA) and the national rank on the Scholastic Aptitude Test (hereafter SAT). In
1For instance, see Camerer and Hogarth (1999).
2We should note that not each such study has turned up such a relationship. For instance, Georganas et
al. (2010) nd that measures of intelligence are poorly related to the strategic sophistication in games. Also
see Bajo et al. (2011), Bayer and Renou (2011), and Chen et al. (2011).
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particular, our subjects make a choice in a dictator game in which it is possible to keep $10.
Our subjects also complete a nine item Social Value Orientation (hereafter SVO) measure for
smaller monetary stakes.
We nd that higher GPA subjects are more selsh in the dictator game than are lower
GPA subjects. We also nd that subjects who performed better on the Math portion of the
SAT are more generous than students who performed worse. We do not nd a relationship
between the Verbal portion of the SAT and choice in the dictator game. There is also evidence
of a positive relationship generosity in the SVO and both GPA and Math SAT scores.
Each of the nine items contained in the SVO are nearly identical.3 As such, the coherence
of the choices on these items allows a measure of the consistency of a subject. We nd
evidence that GPA is related to the consistency of SVO choices. However, we do not nd
evidence of a relationship between consistency and either portion of the SAT. Additionally,
we nd some evidence that GPA is related to the consistency between the SVO and dictator
game choices. Again however, we do not nd evidence that consistency between SVO and
dictator game choices are related to either portion of the SAT.
1.1 Related Literature
There exists a literature which examines the relationship between measures of intelligence and
economic preferences. However, much of the literature focuses on a di¤erent set of preferences,
such as time preferences or preferences toward risk. For instance, Frederick (2005) reports
that subjects which perform better on an IQ-type test exhibit more patience with respect to
payments over time and exhibit less risk aversion over small-stakes gambles.4 By contrast,
we examine the link between social preferences and measures of intelligence.
There is also a literature which examines the relationship between the consistency of
answers and measures of intelligence. For instance, Berks et al. (2009) nds that the results
on an IQ-type test is related to the consistency of choices made on questions involving time
or risk preferences. Eckel (1999) nds that grade point average of the students is related to
3See Appendix C for the SVO items.
4Also, found by Benjamin et al. (2006), Burks et al. (2009), and Dohmen et al. (2010). Yang and Lester
(2008) examine the causes of irrationality, including intelligence.
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the consistency of choices made on questions involving risk preferences. We perform a similar
exercise and nd some evidence that GPA is related to consistency, however we do not nd a
relationship between SAT outcomes and consistency.
Researchers have sought to understand the relationship between di¤erent personality fea-
tures and social preferences. For instance, Van Lange et al. (1997) nd that age, childhood
experiences, and family structure are all related to social preferences. Also, Swope et al.
(2008) nd a weak relationship between between the personality traits of United States Naval
Academy students and behavior in the dictator game, ultimatum game, trust game, and pris-
oners dilemma game.
To our knowledge, there are only a few other papers which examine the relationship be-
tween measures of intelligence and social preferences.5 Brandstätter and Güth (2002) report
a signicant negative relationship between giving in a dictator game and performance on cog-
nitive tests. Ben-Ner et al. (2004) nd a signicant negative relationship between giving in a
dictator game and performance on the Wonderlic test of intelligence. Further, this relation-
ship is stronger for women than for men. On the other hand, Millet and Dewitte (2007), nd
a positive relationship between their measures of intelligence and altruistic behavior.
Whereas we also nd a relationship between our measures of intelligence and social pref-
erences, our ndings are not as as straightforward. We nd that the outcome on the math
portion of the SAT is associated with generosity on both measures of social preferences. We
nd that the GPA is related to generosity on the SVO measure but with selshness in the
dictator game. Finally, we do not nd a relationship between the outcome on the verbal
portion of the SAT and social preferences. We also di¤er from these above studies in that we
have data on GPA and SAT outcomes, which are highly incentivized to the extent that the
outcomes of these variables can have signicant implications for future of the subjects. By
contrast, the studies mentioned above employ measures of intelligence which are not as highly
incentivized.
5Thöni et al. (2009) nd no relationship between educational attainment and behavior in a public goods
game.
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2 Data and Methodology
The choices on social preferences were obtained in connection with Smith (2011). Each
subject was asked for a choice in one of two forms of a dictator game. In one treatment, the
subjects were given a standard $10 dictator game. This dictator game was presented to the
subjects in $0.25 increments. The subjects were directed to indicate which of the 41 dictator
game allocations they most preferred.6 A total of 96 students enrolled in economics classes at
Rutgers University-Camden made a choice in this game. The data for this game was collected
in 5 classes of 16, 21, 39, 12 and 8 subjects.
In the other dictator game treatment, the subjects were asked for their choice in a non-
standard dictator game in which the relative allocation price is 1 to 3. In other words, the
most selsh allocation is $10 to self and $0 to other and the most generous allocation is $0
to self and $30 to other. The subjects own payo¤s were listed in $0.50 increments and the
other subjects payo¤s were listed in $1.50 increments. The subjects were directed to indicate
which of the 21 dictator game allocations they most preferred.7 A total of 90 students in
economics classes at Rutgers University-Camden made a choice in this nonstandard dictator
game. The data for this game was collected in 4 classes of 21, 42, 16 and 11 subjects.
We also measured the Social Value Orientation (SVO) of the subjects. Our specication
of SVO was adapted from Van Lange et al. (1997). The subjects were given the 9 SVO
items such that three items were three pages. In Van Lange et al., the subjects decide on
an allocation of points which carry no nancial implications. By contrast, in our experiment
subjects were o¤ered a conversion rate of points to money, whereby the subject is e¤ectively
deciding on an allocation of a very small amount of money. Across all 9 SVO items, the subject
could keep as little as $0.94 and as much as $1.06. Also across the SVO items, the subject
could send as little as $0.19 and send as much as $0.94. The subjects were not told these
amounts, however they could be calculated with relative ease. The exchange rate between
the Van Lange et al. numbers and the monetary payment was designed to provide only a
small monetary incentive.
6See Appendix A for this standard dictator game.
7See Appendix B for this nonstandard dictator game.
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Each of the nine items has an individualistic response, a prosocial response and a compet-
itive response. The individualistic response is the one in which the material payo¤s accruing
to oneself are the largest. In other words, selecting the individualistic choice suggests that the
subject neither positively nor negatively values material payo¤s accruing to the other subject.
The prosocial response is the one in which the sum of the material payo¤s accruing to both
the subject and the other subject are the largest. In other words, selecting the prosocial
response suggests that the subject positively values the material payo¤s accruing to the other
subject. The competitive response is the one in which the di¤erence between the material
payo¤s accruing to the subject and the other subject are the largest. In other words, selecting
the competitive choice suggests that the subject negatively values material payo¤s accruing
to the other subject. The exact items and the conversion from points to money in the SVO
measure is given in Appendix C. Following Van Lange et al., we would classify a subject
as prosocial, individualistic or competitive if the subject answered six of the nine items in a
particular fashion.
As was the point of Smith (2011), within each dictator treatment, we also varied the order
of the dictator game and the SVO measurement. Roughly half of each class made a choice in
the dictator game then SVO items and half answered the SVO items then made a choice in
the dictator game.
The responses for the SVO and the dictator game were entered on paper. These choices
were incentivized to the extent that one out of every four subjects within each class were paid
the actual amounts obtained. In this experiment, we employed a triadic design. The subjects
were told to make their allocation decisions involving themselves ("You") and another subject
("Other1"). Another subject ("Other2") was to make allocations involving Other2 and You.
Therefore, the amount accruing to each subject was what was kept in the You-Other1 alloca-
tion decisions plus what Other2 did not keep in the Other2-You allocation decisions. In both
the measurement of SVO and the choice in the dictator game, the status of You, Other1 and
Other2 remained xed. This description of the triadic design was provided verbally by the
same male experimenter and in written form given to each subject.
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The data on measures of intelligence were obtained from the O¢ ce of the Registrar of
Rutgers University-Camden. The registrar could locate data on cumulative GPA for 185 of
the 186 subjects. Data on SAT scores could only be located for 85 of the 186 subjects. The
SAT scores were only available for students who were admitted as freshmen. In other words,
the SAT scores for transfer students were not available.
3 Results
3.1 Overview
We now present an overview of the variables which we use in the analysis. The variable SVO
First obtains a value of 1 if the SVO was administered rst, and a 0 otherwise. The Standard
Dictator variable obtains a 1 if the standard dictator was used and a 0 otherwise. We use
two measures of the amount kept in the dictator game: Dictator Kept and Dictator Fraction
Kept. The variable Dictator Kept is simply the amount kept in the dictator game. In the
case of both the standard version and the nonstandard version, this can range from 0 to 10.
The variable Dictator Fraction Kept normalizes the amount of money kept in the dictator
game by the total amount of money given to both players. Obviously this amount ranges
from 0 to 1.
The variable GPA is the cumulative GPA of the student as of Fall 2009. Math SAT and
Verbal SAT express the percentiles of the results on these portions of the SAT. The variable
Female takes a value of 1 if the subject is female and 0 otherwise. The registrar also provided
the birthdays of the subjects. From this we calculate Age which is the number of years old
as of January 1, 2010. The variable Class indicates the last two digits of the expected year of
graduation. For instance, a student expected to graduate in 2011 would obtain a value of 11.
The Prosocial variable takes a value of 1 if the subject was categorized as having ProSocial
preferences according to the SVO and a 0 otherwise. The Classication variable obtains a
value of 1 if the SVO classies the subject as either prosocial, individualistic or competitive.
We provide the summary statistics for these variables in Table 1.
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Table 1-Summary of the variables
Variable Observations Mean Standard Deviation Minimum Maximum
SVO First 185 0:502 0:501 0 1
Standard Dictator 185 0:514 0:501 0 1
Dictator Kept 185 6:631 2:792 0 10
Dictator Fraction Kept 185 0:583 0:277 0 1
GPA 185 3:045 0:597 0:323 4:00
Math SAT 86 48:686 19:653 4:0 74:0
Verbal SAT 86 47:116 15:681 5:0 75:0
Female 185 0:357 0:480 0 1
Age 184 22:08 5:27 17:04 60:62
Class 185 10:37 0:805 9 13
Prosocial 185 0:405 0:492 0 1
Classication 185 0:848 0:359 0 1
We note that, although we conduct the experiment in a college setting, there are several
students who are older than a typical college student.8 We considered dropping these subjects
as outliers however, it was not obvious precisely which students should be excluded and the
variable is not central to the study. We note that there are no signicant di¤erences in the
Dictator Kept, Dictator Fraction Kept, GPA or Prosocial variables of the subjects who have
SAT data available and those who do not. We also note that there are no signicant di¤erences
between the Dictator Kept, Dictator Fraction Kept, GPA, Prosocial or SAT variables of the
subjects in each of the 9 experimental sessions.9
3.2 Measures of Intelligence and Behavior in the Dictator Game
We now examine the relationship between our measures of intelligence and choice made in the
dictator game. We perform the following regressions with a dependent variable of Dictator
Kept. Regression (1) employs only our measures of intelligence: GPA and SAT outcomes.
Regressions (2) and (3) consider only the GPA and SAT outcomes, respectively, along with
the details of the treatment: the order of the experiment, the type of dictator game and the
interaction. Regression (4) considers all three intelligence measures and the details of the
treatment. Finally, regression (5) considers all three measures of intelligence, the details of
8The subjects with ages over 30 include: 60, 52, 42, 38, 37, 33, 32, and three of 31.
9These are available from the corresponding author upon request.
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the treatment, and background details for the subjects. We summarize the results in Table
2.
Table 2-Relationship between Dictator Kept and Measures of Intelligence
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
GPA 1:236 0:403   1:103 1:208
(0:517) (0:347) (0:510) (0:548)
Math SAT  0:0300    0:0370  0:0395  0:0402
(0:0152) (0:0151) (0:0149) (0:0155)
Verbal SAT 0:0152   0:0149 0:0107 0:00623
(0:0192) (0:0188) (0:0185) (0:0191)
SVO First    0:881  2:751  2:593  2:639
(0:580) (0:853) (0:837) (0:849)
Standard Dictator    1:388  2:084  1:863  1:5317
(0:574) (0:791) (0:780) (0:840)
SVO First*Standard Dictator   0:812 3:277 3:340 3:319
(0:807) (1:182) (1:157) (1:181)
Female          0:112
(0:671)
Age         0:118
(0:114)
Class          0:182
(0:453)
R2 0:11 0:06 0:17 0:22 0:24
Observations 86 185 86 86 86
Result of regressions where *** indicates signicance at p < 0:01, ** indicates
signicance at p < 0:05 and * indicates signicance at p < 0:10.
We nd a relationship between the amount kept in the dictator game and GPA. In
regressions (1), (4), and (5) we nd that higher GPA subjects keep more in the dictator game,
than do lower GPA subjects. We also nd a negative relationship between the amount kept
in the dictator game and Math SAT. In regressions (1), (3), (4), and (5) we nd that higher
Math SAT subjects keep less in the dictator game than do lower Math SAT subjects. Finally,
note that we do not nd a relationship between the amount kept in the dictator game and
Verbal SAT.
We note the signicant relationships which are related to the details of the experiment.
As does Smith (2011), we nd that the order of the presentation of the experimental material
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is related to choice. In particular, we nd that subjects who rst responded to the SVO were
more generous in the dictator game than subjects who responded rst to the dictator game.
We also note that the coe¢ cient involving the specication of the dictator game is signicant
in regressions (2)-(5). Further, the interaction between the order and the form of the game
is signicant in regressions (3), (4), and (5).
While we are encouraged by the results summarized in Table 2, it is potentially problematic
that the term involving the form of the dictator game is signicant. In order to account for
this feature, we perform the analogous analysis as above, with the exception that the
dependent variable is the fraction kept in the dictator game. We summarize the results in
Table 3.
Table 3-Relationship between Dictator Fraction Kept and Measures of Intelligence
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
GPA 0:114 0:0531   0:130 0:138
(0:0518) (0:0348) (0:0497) (0:0531)
Math SAT  0:00263    0:00323  0:00353  0:00388
(0:00152) (0:00149) (0:00145) (0:00150)
Verbal SAT 0:00164   0:00159 0:00111 0:000563
(0:00192) (0:00185) (0:00180) (0:00185)
SVO First    0:0823  0:263  0:245  0:247
(0:0582) (0:0841) (0:0815) (0:0823)
Standard Dictator   0:0291  0:0378  0:0118 0:0309
(0:0576) (0:0780) (0:0759) (0:0815)
SVO First*Standard Dictator   0:0776 0:315 0:322 0:301
(0:0809) (0:117) 0:113 (0:115)
Female          0:0693
(0:0651)
Age         0:007101
(0:0111)
Class          0:0326
(0:0439)
R2 0:10 0:04 0:18 0:25 0:27
Observations 86 185 86 86 86
Result of regressions where *** indicates signicance at p < 0:01, ** indicates
signicance at p < 0:05 and * indicates signicance at p < 0:10.
Despite the di¤erences in the dependent variables, the qualitative results presented in Table
2 remain largely unchanged here. In particular, we note a positive relationship between the
amount kept in the dictator game and GPA, as seen in regressions (1), (4), and (5). We also
see a negative relationship between the amount kept in the dictator game and Math SAT, as
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seen in regressions (1), (3)-(5). Finally, we do not observe a signicant relationship between
Verbal SAT and the amount kept in the dictator game.
Also similar to the results of Table 2, here we nd that the SVO First and the interaction
terms are signicant in regressions (3)-(5). However, unlike the previous analysis, here we
nd that the form of the dictator game is not signicant. In our view this suggests that the
use of the fraction of money kept is capturing the di¤erences in behavior due to the di¤erent
forms of the dictator games.
In summary, we observe a positive relationship between intelligence, as measured by GPA
and selshness in the dictator game. We also observe a negative relationship between in-
telligence, as measured by Math SAT, and selshness in the dictator game. Finally, we do
not observe a signicant relationship between intelligence, as measured by Verbal SAT, and
selshness in the dictator game.
3.3 Measures of Intelligence and SVO
We now turn our attention to the relationship between the SVO classication and our measures
of intelligence. In particular, we examine the relationship between the classication for
generosity according to the SVO measure and intelligence. As such, we employ Prosocial
as the dependent variable. Recall that this variable takes a value of 1 if the subject was
classied as prosocial by SVO and a 0 otherwise. Similar to our previous analysis, we seek
to isolate the relationship between social preferences and intelligence. In regression (1) we
include all three measures of intelligence and the order treatment. Regressions (2) and (3)
includes only the GPA measure or the SAT measures respectively, in addition to the order
treatment. In regression (4) we include all three measures of intelligence, the order treatment,
and characteristics of the subjects. Table 4 presents the summary of this analysis.
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Table 4-The Prosocial variable and Measures of Intelligence.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
GPA 0:962 0:484   0:883
(0:455) (0:269) (0:484)
Math SAT 0:0275   0:0291 0:0312
(0:0138) (0:0141) (0:014)
Verbal SAT 0:0254   0:0259 0:0249
(0:0179) (0:0174) (0:0186)
SVO First 0:969  0:165 0:738 1:1251
(0:518) (0:306) (0:483) (0:5504)
Female       0:545
(0:580)
Age        0:00219
(0:0904)
Class        0:297
(0:383)
-2 log L 100:18 245:77 105:05 98:48
LR 2 13:36 4:03 8:48 15:05
Observations 86 185 86 86
Result of logistic regressions where *** indicates signicance at p < 0:01, **
indicates signicance at p < 0:05 and * indicates signicance at p < 0:10.
First, we nd some evidence of a positive relationship between GPA and the prosocial
classication. This relationship is signicant at the 0:05 level in regression (1) and signicant
at the 0:10 level in regressions (2) and (4). In other words, higher GPA subjects are more
likely to be categorized as being generous by SVO. We also nd a positive relationship between
Math SAT scores and the prosocial classication. This relationship is signicant at the 0:05
level in regressions (1), (3) and (4). In other words, higher Math SAT subjects are more
likely to be categorized as being generous by SVO. Again we do not nd such a relationship
involving Verbal SAT.
We also note that the SVO First coe¢ cient is signicant at the 0:1 level in regression (1)
and at the 0:05 level in regression (4). Unlike the analysis summarized in Tables 2 and 3, we do
not include the indicating the specication of the dictator game and the type-order interaction.
However, when we do include these variables, neither of the variables are signicant.10
10These results are available from the corresponding author upon request.
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3.4 Measures of Intelligence and Consistency
Finally, we turn our attention to the relationship between the consistency of choices and our
measures of intelligence. Recall that the SVO measure consists of nine nearly identical items.
If the subject answers six of the nine items in the same manner then the SVO will classify
the subject as one of three types. It seems reasonable to use the condition of being classied
as a measure of consistency. Therefore, as a dependent variable we use Classication, which
assigns a 1 to a subject who is classied according to their choices of SVO and 0 otherwise.
Table 5 summarizes our analysis.
Table 5-The Classication Variable and Measures of Intelligence
(1) (2) (3) (4)
GPA 0:9279 0:871   0:742
(0:4751) (0:337) (0:499)
Math SAT 0:0145   0:0153 0:0179
(0:0133) (0:0126) (0:0142)
Verbal SAT 0:0168   0:0192 0:0145
(0:0163) (0:0157) (0:0169)
SVO First 0:6019 0:351 0:428 0:698
(0:5576) (0:426) (0:536) (0:589)
Female       0:174
(0:645)
Age        0:0737
(0:0922)
Class        0:549
(0:398)
-2 log L 86:339 150:26 90:32 84:40
LR 2 6:95 7:01 2:97 8:88
Observations 86 185 86 86
Result of logistic regressions where *** indicates signicance at p < 0:01, **
indicates signicance at p < 0:05 and * indicates signicance at p < 0:10.
Here we nd some evidence that GPA is related to consistency. Specically, in regression
(1) we nd that GPA is related to consistency at the 0:1 level, and it is signicant at the 0:01
level in regression (3). However, we note that GPA is not signicantly related to consistency
in regression (4). Surprisingly, the results of the SAT, in particular the Math portion of the
SAT, are not related to consistency. In none of the regressions above are either Math or
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Verbal SAT results related to consistency.
We also consider another notion of consistency: the agreement between the choices on
the SVO and that made in the dictator game. To accomplish this, we rst run two sets
of regressions. The rst set is with Dictator Fraction Kept as the dependent variable and
Prosocial as an independent variable. The second set of regressions uses the squared residuals
obtained in the rst set, with measures of intelligence as the independent variables. In this
way we can determine if these measures of intelligence are related to the agreement between
the choices on the SVO and the choice made in the dictator game.
In both regressions (1) and (2) below we use the responses on the SVO as an independent
variable and the fraction of money kept in the dictator game as dependent variable. In
regression (1) we also include the SVO First as an independent variable. In regression (2) we
also include the Standard Dictator and SVO First- Standard Dictator interaction. Table 6
summarizes these results.
Table 6-Relationship between Dictator Fraction Kept and SVO
(1) (2)
Prosocial  0:222  0:217
(0:0382) (0:0389)
SVO First  0:0628  0:0946
(0:0375) (0:0539)
Standard Dictator    0:00829
(0:0535)
SVO First*Standard Dictator   0:0612
(0:0752)
R2 0:16 0:17
Observations 185 185
Result of regressions where *** indicates signicance at p < 0:01, and * indi-
cates signicance at p < 0:10.
Now we use the squared residuals obtained in the regressions summarized in Table 6 as
dependent variables in the regressions summarized below. In each of the regressions below,
we use the measures of intelligence as independent variables in order to determine if the
agreement between SVO and dictator choices is related to our measures of intelligence. In
regressions (1:1), (1:2) and (1:3) below, we use the squared residuals obtained in regression
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(1) as summarized in Table 7 as the dependent variable. In regressions (2:1), (2:2) and (2:3)
below, we used the squared residuals obtained in regression (2) as summarized in Table 7 as
the dependent variable.
Table 7-Relationship Between Consistency and Measures of Intelligence
(1:1) (1:2) (1:3) (2:1) (2:2) (2:3)
GPA  :0245    0:0259  0:0234    0:0251
(0:0120) (0:0185) (0:0119) (0:0177)
Math SAT   0:000225 0:000294   0:000174 0:000240
(0:000546) (0:000545) (0:000524) (0:000523)
Verbal SAT    0:000992  0:000875    0:000964  0:000851
(0:000685) (0:000686) (0:000656) (0:000657)
R2 0:02 0:03 0:05 0:02 0:03 0:05
Observations 185 86 86 185 86 86
The dependent variable of regressions (1:1), (1:2) and (1:3) is the squared resid-
uals of regression (1) as summarized in Table 6. The dependent variable of regres-
sions (2:1), (2:2) and (2:3) is the squared residuals of regression (2) as summarized
in Table 6. Further, ** indicates signicance at p < 0:05 and * indicates signi-
cance at p < 0:10.
Similar to the analysis summarized in Table 5, we nd some evidence that GPA is related
to consistency. In both regressions (1:1) and (2:1) we nd that GPA is related to consistency
as measured by the agreement between SVO and dictator game choices. However, this
relationship is not robust to changes in the model. In particular, when we include the
outcomes on the SAT, GPA is no longer signicant. Also similar to the results summarized
in Table 5, here we also do not nd a relationship between the squared residuals and either
portion of the SAT. Finally, we note that the above analysis, conducted with the absolute
value of the residuals rather than the squared residuals, yields even weaker evidence of a
relationship. In particular, the GPA coe¢ cient in Regression (1:1) is only signicant at the
0.1 level and Regression (2:1) is not signicant.
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4 Discussion and Conclusions
Increasingly in economics, researchers are becoming interested in examining the role of cogni-
tive ability in economic behavior. However, before researchers can make accurate inferences
of strategic choices give measures of intelligence, we must have a better understanding of other
relevant correlates of cognitive ability. As such, in this paper we examine the relationship
between measures of intelligence and social preferences.
We nd that our incentivized measures of intelligence are related to social preferences.
In particular, we nd evidence of a negative relationship between performance on the Math
portion of the SAT and selshness in both the dictator game and the SVO measure. By
contrast, we nd a positive relationship between GPA and selshness in the dictator game,
but a negative relationship between GPA and selshness on the SVO measure. Finally, we
only nd some evidence of a relationship between GPA and consistency of choices. We do
not nd such evidence for either portion of the SAT.
While it is obvious that the GPA and SAT measures are di¤erent, we are surprised by the
qualitative di¤erences found above. Therefore, we nd evidence of a relationship between
our measures of intelligence and social preferences, however it seems that each measure of
intelligence is capturing a di¤erent aspect of intelligence. We also note that there are no
systematic di¤erences in the social preferences in the basis of gender. Previous work has
found a relationship between gender and generosity,11 however our data does not support
such a relationship.
While we are encouraged by our results, there is more to be explored. For instance,
additional data is needed in order to better identify the relative merits of the measures of
intelligence which we use. We are also aware of the limitations of the measures of social pref-
erences which we use. One way to remedy this would be to conduct a thorough investigation
of social preferences, ala Charness and Rabin (2002), when considering incentivized measures
of intelligence.
11For instance, see Eckel and Grossman (1998) and Andreoni and Vesterlund (2001).
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Appendix A
Standard Dictator Game
17
Appendix B
Nonstandard Dictator Game
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Appendix C
Social Value Orientation (SVO)
We asked the following 9 items (from Van Lange et al., 1997) in order to measure the SVO
of the subjects. Each of the 9 items has a prosocial answer, a individualistic answer and a
competitive answer. Each item is stated in terms of points where 100 points corresponded to
$0.02103.
Question 1 A B C
You: 480 points 540 points 480 points
Other1: 80 points 280 points 480 points
Question 2 A B C
You: 560 points 500 points 500 points
Other1: 300 points 500 points 100 points
Question 3 A B C
You: 520 points 520 points 580 points
Other1: 520 points 120 points 320 points
Question 4 A B C
You: 500 points 560 points 490 points
Other1: 100 points 300 points 490 points
Question 5 A B C
You: 560 points 500 points 490 points
Other1: 300 points 500 points 90 points
Question 6 A B C
You: 500 points 500 points 570 points
Other1: 500 points 100 points 300 points
Question 7 A B C
You: 510 points 560 points 510 points
Other1: 510 points 300 points 110 points
Question 8 A B C
You: 550 points 500 points 500 points
Other1: 300 points 100 points 500 points
Question 9 A B C
You: 480 points 490 points 540 points
Other1: 100 points 490 points 300 points
The individualistic answers are: 1B, 2A, 3C, 4B, 5A, 6C, 7B, 8A and 9C. The prosocial
answers are: 1C, 2B, 3A, 4C, 5B, 6A, 7A, 8C and 9B. The competitive answers are: 1A, 2C,
3B, 4A, 5C, 6B, 7C, 8B and 9A. Van Lange et al. classies a subject according to the above
labels if six or more items are selected in a similar fashion.
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